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Eccles’ Challenge: verbal reports of expert knowledge 
In elite sport, the advantages demonstrated by expert performers over novices are sometimes 
due in part to their superior physical fitness or to their greater technical precision in executing 
specialist motor skills. However at the very highest levels, all competitors typically share 
extraordinary physical capacities and have supremely well-honed techniques. Among the extra 
factors which can differentiate between the best performers, psychological skills are paramount. 
These range from the capacities to cope under pressure and to bounce back from setbacks, to the 
knowledge of themselves, opponents, and the domain, which experts access and apply in 
performance. In the companion chapter on breadth and depth of knowledge in expert sport (see 
Chapter 11), we discussed the forms or kinds of knowledge deployed by elite athletes, and described 
some lines of research which seek to tap and study such expert knowledge (McPherson & 
MacMahon, 2008; McRobert, Ward, Eccles & Williams, 2011). In this chapter we focus more directly 
on questions about methods for measuring or more accurately assessing expert knowledge, in 
particular addressing a wider range of methods to help us understand what experts know. 
Suggesting that sport researchers can productively adopt and adapt existing qualitative 
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methodologies for integration with more standard quantitative methods, we introduce and survey a 
number of areas of qualitative research in psychology. 
Since the cognitive revolution, mainstream psychologists have been increasingly cautious 
about the utility of verbal reports of cognitive processes. Since the bulk of processing occurs at lower 
levels in the cognitive system and is not consciously accessible, it is thought, we need objective 
observational methods to catch the system in action. But in a trenchant recent review of work on 
verbal reports in sport psychology, David Eccles (2012) argues that the field has not taken this 
theoretical scepticism seriously enough, and is still over-reliant on reports of verbal data collected in 
poorly-controlled ways. Reviewing classical studies of people’s significant inaccuracy in reporting the 
thoughts mediating their decisions and actions (Nisbett & Wilson 1977), Eccles argues that in general 
much of cognition is ‘inaccessible to consciousness’: he quotes Dennett’s (2003) claim that 
“consciousness of the springs of action is the exception, not the rule” (p. 246). Many apparent 
reports of cognitive processes are in fact confabulations, arising from implicit cultural or 
subculturally-sanctioned theories which involve causal claims that may be quite disconnected from 
the actual causal processes underlying action. 
But Eccles sees this pessimism as tempered by the possibility of using clear guidelines to 
access what individuals can accurately report. Following Ericsson and Simon (1980; see also Fox, 
Ericsson, & Best, 2011), Eccles suggests that the only material that can be accurately reported is that 
which was attended to or heeded in short term memory (STM) during the execution of a task. This 
can either be directly verbalized or recoded “into a verbal mode” (Eccles, 2012, p. 105). The best 
ways to elicit such legitimate verbal data are to ask practitioners to think aloud during performance 
(‘concurrent reporting’) or – as will often be required in dynamic sport tasks – collecting reports 
straight after task performance (immediately retrospective reporting). Experts should ideally be 
asked questions which are not overly directive, and do not constrain the participant to interpret 
their thoughts or to report only about some particular target interest of the researcher (like coping 
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efforts, or self-talk strategies). Instead, undirected probes which merely ask for the thoughts the 
individual remembers having can provide information with more optimal scope and of sounder 
validity. Participants can be trained swiftly to report only on what they are or have been thinking 
rather than to interpret, theorize, or comment on their own cognitive processes. These methods can 
also aim at gathering verbal reports of specific episodes rather than general reports about how 
experts usually think or make decisions. 
Eccles (2012) performs a critical content analysis of an array of sport research which used 
verbal report data in studies of psychological skill. He found that many of them did not use prompts 
which optimized the validity of the reports given. Most studies in his sample used interview 
methods, but employed directive probes, tapped only general states rather than particular episodes, 
and involved longer delays between the episode and the report. In summarising the quotations 
provided as results in these research articles, Eccles suggests that “these studies provided no 
evidence of a participant having recalled any actual thought from any specific episode” (p. 112). 
Other recent work, of course, does adhere more closely to the research guidelines Eccles 
outlines. In the work by McPherson and by McRobert, Roca, Ward and colleagues which we 
discussed in the chapter on breadth and depth of knowledge (Chapter 11), verbal reports are 
typically gathered on an immediately retrospective basis, for example between points in tennis. In 
one study of anticipation and decision-making in football, for example, Roca and colleagues trained 
participants on how to think aloud in 30-minute sessions offering practice in “giving immediate 
retrospective verbal reports by solving a series of both generic and sport-specific tasks” (Roca et al., 
2011, p. 307). Nevertheless, Eccles’ critical survey raises important questions about the degree of 
input a researcher should have in shaping the content of self-report, the timing of recall and the 
specificity of the event under scrutiny. While we agree that sport researchers should be more aware 
of these think-aloud protocols, in this chapter we argue for the inclusion of a wider range of 
methods to tap expert knowledge by way of verbal report. 
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In attempting to give explanatory causal accounts of specific mechanisms underlying 
expertise, we may need a very specific form of verbal report. But there are many forms of 
knowledge relevant to expertise – knowing the background form of another player, knowing how to 
compensate for general personal tendencies in the face of a certain genre of challenge, recently-
updated knowledge of local conditions and their likely effects on particular kinds of play, and so on. 
Eccles’ admirably narrow conception of valid self-report suggests that all one needs to discover 
about skill relates to a single occurrent episode, veridically described, as it unfolds in real time. If 
possible, this is almost self-report as a stand in for a camera. The method is explicitly set up to 
exclude personal meaning, context, history, experience of embodiment, or knowledge of context. 
Other levels of knowledge and personal insight among expert performers might, we suggest, be 
added to and integrated with these recommendations for optimizing valid responses. Experts are 
not always as ignorant of their own cognitive processes, not so constantly and consistently prone to 
confabulation, as is suggested by the classical literature cited by Eccles. Indeed, they are sometimes 
able to open up their own knowledge base to revision, reorganization, and updating. They can access 
and discuss some aspects of their own cognitive processes (Chaffin, Imreh & Crawford, 2002). If 
certain components of expert skill knowledge are thus more or less accessible, they are likely also to 
be shareable with researchers as well as with coaches and peers, provided the researcher 
establishes a situation of sufficient rapport, asks the right questions, and the practitioner is 
appropriately motivated and has no reason not to share.  
Case study: Bicknell’s staircase 
At a 2006 Australian national cross-country mountain biking event in Thredbo, the course 
included a damp and muddy ‘staircase’ section, at which riders took a range of different options. 
Some jumped off their bikes and ran, others pulled hard on the front brake to force the bike into a 
nose pivot down a wooden plank, while others slowed so much they were only just moving to steer 
down the edge of the stairs. Participant researcher, Kath Bicknell successfully navigated this section 
after watching the competitors pass. She wrote later that “If you asked me right away to describe 
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how I had done this, I wouldn’t be able to tell you exactly what I had done differently this time ... I 
would probably have said what other riders had told me: ‘You’ve just gotta commit’” (Bicknell, 2010, 
p. 86).  
Cycling experts can often tell you what they did, even if not immediately afterwards. Bicknell 
(2010) notes that in cycling down a perilous staircase like this, you need to “keep your body weight 
behind the seat of the bike” [so that] the bike stays stable as it hits the flat ground at the exit – 
meaning the rider’s body will not flip over the front wheel” (p. 87-88). This is background knowledge 
for most experts. In applying her knowledge to this new situation, Bicknell thinks back: “When I had 
tried the stairs previously, I had slowed so much while turning that I had not believed that it was 
possible to complete the turn before falling off the bike, and I had put my foot out to scoot down the 
staircase instead. … By breaking the conscious direction of the movement into aiming toward the 
edge of the stairs, followed by looking toward the exit, I was able to successfully negotiate the turn 
and finish the rest of the complex manoeuvre. It is in this way that I guided my own reinvention of 
the correct technique ...” (p. 88). 
So while an expert might offer up a general maxim immediately after a ride, with patience and 
insightful questioning the researcher can move beyond the motto or the press release. The motto, 
‘you’ve just gotta commit’ conveys the point that “when a rider has not committed to such a move, 
often due to doubt, fear, or distraction, their body position will alter due to muscle tension, or 
looking in the wrong direction (which often affects shoulder movement, which in turn affects 
steering) and the movement’s outcome will alter” (Bicknell, 2010, p. 88). It is a ‘colloquial shortcut’ 
for a complex phenomenological process of embodying a skill in which cognition is interwoven with 
motor skill.  As Bicknell notes in reflection, her own experience “watching the men ride the staircase 
and then being able to do it myself has also revealed that the developmental process underpinning 
skilled performance does not just come from ‘doing’ but can be developed through cognitive 
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experiences as well” (p. 87).  It is therefore something that can be captured in language and thought 
about, though not necessarily immediately after the action itself.  
As an expert participant observer, Bicknell has the capacity to notice and relay in language 
much that a novice observer would miss. She suggests that skill embodiment “develops more 
through a process of emulation and belief rather than practice, error correction and repetition. Like 
jumping off a diving board for the first time, you cannot half ride a staircase, learning little 
components of the skill along the way. You need speed, momentum, body position and commitment 
to the manoeuvre at the beginning of the action, to relax during it, and to know what shape you 
want to feel yourself in as you finish it off” (p. 87). When a practitioner who is also a theorist of skill 
gives an account of skill development, we get a window into higher levels of skill acquisition. While 
she is able to give a detailed description of the isolated moments of turning the bike wheel down the 
difficult staircase, the form of self-report offered and the levels and complexity of knowledge in play 
here go far beyond that alone. Here is a participant theorizing with and for you.  A rare case?  We 
suggest that the thoughtfulness of experts about their domain of expertise, or the scope of their 
expertise, should not be underestimated. Knowledge informs perception-action couplings through 
shaping what one notices and how much, as expert participant observation reveals. 
On a wider view of skill, expert knowledge covers the core features of motor execution, 
perception-action coupling, and the experience of the acquisition of embodied skills. It includes 
response selection and strategy, which entails knowing one’s own form, an opponent’s form, how 
well they have mapped one’s own style, and the current competitive context.  Novices have much to 
learn from the moment-to-moment accounts of experience of skilled performance, including how 
people sustain emotional resilience in the face of stress and challenge (both long-term strain and 
contingent, local challenges), as well as handling the social consequences of fame and public 
scrutiny. There is on occasion more knowledge folded into a single shot or episode than could 
perhaps ever be conveyed in concurrent verbalization. Immediately retrospective reporting in most 
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cases would be useful, but such access may not be possible for researchers who seek to study elite 
sport performance. Further, much of the knowledge may be tacit, in the sense that it is not 
necessarily operating explicitly at the moment of performance, but yet still informs decision and 
action. The expert may not be in a position to volunteer it as relevant. Because much thus relies on 
the insight and skill of the researcher, a wider palette of methodological tools may be useful. 
Overview of Qualitative Methods 
Qualitative research is particularly useful in breaking new ground where there is not yet an 
established body of knowledge, or where there are as yet few existing findings to generate nuanced 
and specific hypotheses, nor existing theoretical models of the phenomenon of interest. It can be 
particularly helpful when all we have to start with is a researcher with a pressing research question 
that may have arisen from personal experience in a field.  So at that stage, to counter possible 
personal bias, we need to add the views of others to our own implicit theories and hunches about 
what might be going on. Interviews and focus groups with expert practitioners can function as a 
reconnaissance flight over the conceptual terrain, prior to commitment to a more detailed 
qualitative study, a questionnaire, or taking a relevant parameter experimentally into the lab. 
Qualitative theorizing is not for everyone.  The component skills are succinctly outlined by 
Gilgun (2009): “Skills required to do qualitative theory building and model testing are (a) capacities 
to draw detailed descriptions of phenomena of interest from respondents, from observations of 
settings, and from documents of various types; (b) capacities for conceptual thinking, that is, the 
ability to conceptualize social phenomena and identify them in data; (c) capacities for flexible 
thinking, where researchers are willing to challenge and undermine their own preconceptions and 
favorite theories, some of which may be out of their awareness; and (d) the discipline to answer 
questions such as, ‘How do my findings add to, modify, transform, or undermine what is already 
known?’ For many researchers, qualitative research is a way of thinking” (p. 95). 
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Despite its challenges, it is worthwhile achieving expertise in this domain, to supplement other 
methodological skills, even if one does not take the skills all the way through to theory-building. For 
example, science requires the use of established, reliable coding schemes. However, if coding 
schemes are adapted from other domains or other sports, the trade-off in relevance loss may not be 
compensated for by the reliability sought. A researcher may need to devise a purpose-built coding 
scheme in ways that meet the requirements of science: the process is made public, verifiable and 
replicable. So what are the relevant considerations with regards to sampling, coding and analysis? 
Moving from one research method to another requires reassessment of expectations: integrating 
qualitative methods into your research requires revisiting assumptions about sample size, the prior 
existence of precise hypotheses, at what level generalization of results is possible, and whether one 
can aspire to universal laws. A common error in moving from quantitative research to qualitative is 
to assume that sample size hinges on the number of people in a sample rather than the array of 
experiences sampled. Getting a large sample size is often seen as an issue and there are often 
concerns about generalizability. The concern for generalizability arises because many mistakenly 
believe that the unit of analysis is the person, whereas the unit of analysis is in fact the element of 
experience. One can canvas a vast array of experiences with fifteen interviews if one includes in the 
sample people who vary along relevant parameters. 
Grounded Theory (Glaser & Strauss, 1967) is one central form of qualitative method to 
which researchers turn as a generator of theory where existing theory is inappropriate or absent. 
Theory generated in this way is “derived from data, systematically gathered and analyzed through 
the research process” (Strauss & Corbin, 1998, p. 12). The aim “is to produce innovative theory that 
is ‘grounded’ in data collected from participants on the basis of the complexities of their lived 
experiences in a social context” (Fassinger, 2005, p. 157). A new field without established findings 
means hypotheses cannot be devised in advance. As Gilgun (1995) notes: “Rather than preselecting 
hypotheses and the concepts on which they are based, grounded theory seeks to discover them 
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through processes of emergence, which occur over the course of data analysis and interpretation” 
(p. 268).  
A variant methodology, which permits a researcher to enter a domain of research with 
formed hunches and broad hypotheses is called Modified Analytic Induction (MAI). According to 
Gilgun (1995), who champions this method, it is permissible to have hypotheses that are “rough and 
general approximations, prior to entry into the field or, in cases where data already are collected, 
prior to data analysis. These hypotheses can be based on hunches, assumptions, careful examination 
of research and theory, or combinations” (p. 269). Hypotheses are not static, but are “revised to fit 
emerging interpretations of the data over the course of data collection and analysis” (p. 269). An 
important attribute of MAI is that one searches for instances that are likely to disconfirm conclusions 
so far.  In this way, one adds enough variability to the sample until one is sure the conclusions are 
robust. 
If one is permitted to revise hypotheses in the light of the data, it is important that one is not 
just cherry-picking, modifying emphasis to find the conclusion that confirms one’s prior convictions. 
So there are clear ways of approaching acknowledgement of the possible biases of the researcher in 
devising the sample and the animating question (sensitizing concepts), in interviewing the 
participants (writing memos about the experience of rapport or absence thereof), and in analyzing 
the data (via open, axial and selective coding).   
One aim of all forms of qualitative methodology is to let the data speak. Coding schemes 
need to arise from the data itself rather than personal hunches and pet theories. Coding has 
subjective elements. For example, a researcher who is also an expert in the domain under study will 
perhaps see more in the responses than will someone without detailed domain-relevant, content-
based expertise. The inclusion of both coders may have advantages to allow the data to disrupt and 
reconfigure preconceptions which an expert may not discern as operating to shape what is seen as 
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salient. It is optimal if at the end of a study conclusions do not overlap excessively with the 
commencing sensitizing concepts. 
To address implicit theories and unconscious schemas which may bias coding, it is best to 
commence qualitative methodology prior to commencing the research, by writing down hunches 
and sources of interest in a phenomenon as well as processes thought to be operative. This is an 
important phase. Arcuri (2007) notes four advantages of doing this: “first, to elucidate our sensitizing 
concepts, which would be utilised as points of departure from which to ask questions and make 
comparisons (but … not be utilised as data per se); second, to enable us to remain sensitive to and 
minimise potential areas of bias in our ways of interpreting and analysing data (commonly referred 
to as bracketing; Morrow, 2005; Ponterotto, 2005); third, to begin the process of self-reflection, or 
reflexivity, which was to continue throughout the research process (Camic, Rhodes, & Yardley, 2003; 
Marecek, 2003); and, fourth, to contribute to the reader’s ability to identify the lens through which 
the data were interpreted and analysed, and thus determine the ‘extent to which [he or she] is able 
to generalize the findings … to his or her own context’ (Morrow, 2005, p. 252)” (see also Arcuri & 
McIlwain, 2009). 
Then one selects a sample and commences interviewing. As Eccles (2012) suggests, it is best 
to use non-directive probes to optimise the scope of what can be included in a response. In devising 
probes, the researcher decides to what degree the research focuses on the landscape of action or 
the landscape of meaning – whether the aim is to assemble a causal account of what happens, or to 
understand the person’s viewpoint on the experience and why it matters to them to the degree it 
does.  Sometimes, meanings cause.  If the experience of the yips was felt to be a devastating career-
ending moment, for example, it may well have that effect.  
A researcher can then decide how much comparability across subjects is sought, and with 
what economy of time. Having standardised probes and prompts enhances the comparability of 
interviews across participants. Some interviewers see it as important to be free to go more deeply 
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into certain issues that arise with a participant and then modify the probes for subsequent 
interviewees to accommodate unexpected, valuable new material. 
In addition to the advantages of non-directive probes, there is also an advantage to using a 
partly structured stimulus as a probe that has an open-ended element requiring the subject to 
respond in a way that reveals personal material (Loevinger, 1985). An example of the successful use 
of sentence completion stems is Rafaelli et al’s (2001) exploration of the experience of ‘the street’ by 
homeless Brazilian youth. In-depth interviews might not have been possible in this research context, 
and shorter questions got quick replies.  Examples of their sentence stems are: “In the street, I feel . . 
.” “In the street, people . . .” and “The street is not…”. This provides a comparability of focus across 
participants through the use of standard stems, while permitting individual uniqueness to be 
divulged in the way that stem sentences are completed by each participant.  One uses both a direct 
and an indirect probe at the same time. 
Challenges of Qualitative Methods  
As Eccles (2012) notes, not all accounts offered in response to interview probes address the 
unfolding of a single event in time, even if one asks for highly specific material. Sometimes the 
researcher is not being told what happened, or what the player thought at the time, or even what 
the player thinks now. Sports experts may pass on to researchers received wisdom, or material more 
like ‘press releases’ – “apparently misleading, irrelevant and stereotyped initial self-report 
statements [which] prevent appropriate reference to personal experience” (Wiersma, 1988, p. 205). 
In reporting received wisdom, an expert may avoid referring to personal experience by offering 
instead decontextualized maxims arising in the relevant subculture: ‘keep it simple’, ‘focus on what 
you can control’, or ‘move on from failure’. These maxims may reflect broadly held ideals about how 
one should handle failure, for instance, or may be tailored to counter or optimise a particular 
player’s existing tendencies. They do not necessarily convey how to do what the injunction conveys 
12 
as ideal, such as how one moves on from failure. That aspect of experience may be lost unless there 
is a follow-up question. An interviewer should pursue specific detailed content respectfully. 
Yet even these ‘press releases’ from experts may reveal much to a researcher once they are 
interpreted in context (Wiersma, 1988). If one has not managed to establish rapport with an 
interviewee, or if there is some concern about how a researcher is affiliated or where funding is 
from, press releases may be offered. They may be the first level of information a person offers and 
patience is required to go more deeply into experience. To go more deeply, researchers need to 
recognize them in the moment: what is being given and (perhaps) why. Press releases may also 
reflect cultural taboos about acknowledging emotions, particularly negative emotions like rivalry, 
self-doubt and anger: or to bypass envy about being a tall poppy (Feather, 1989) luck rather than 
personal ability may be attributed as the cause of a player’s selection.  
If, as interviewer, one can establish rapport across diverse participants and a range of 
experience levels, interviews can open up a world of insight into skill and its context-relevant 
attributes. Rapport is variously defined as including a ‘frank and open discussion’, as entailing the 
‘acceptance of and co-operation with the research project’ on the part of the interviewee, and the 
researcher’s ‘capacity to engage with the language and culture of the respondent in a way that gains 
a level of trust’ (Dundon & Ryan, 2010, p. 564).  It is not just a feel-good variable; it directly affects 
the nature and validity of the information that the researcher is given.  
Kinds of Coding: integrating qualitative and quantitative methods 
Once data are in hand, across Grounded Theory, Modified Analytic Induction and Sentence 
Completion stems, the next phase is coding. An appropriate starting-point is often a detailed form of 
coding called Open Coding which involves a line-by-line analysis of everything said. In open coding 
one identifies concepts and their properties and dimensions, before moving to Axial Coding, which 
relates concepts to each other on the basis of their properties and dimensions (Strauss & Corbin, 
1998).  
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We can suggest how such thematic exploration might contribute to the understanding of 
sport expertise. Bawden and Maynard (2001) conducted a study based on semi-structured 
interviews of cricketers who had experienced the yips (involuntary movements occurring repeatedly 
in the execution of a skill). They used lead questions with standardized probes in interviews with 
eight bowlers to capture a broad range of experience and a wide array of parameters (level of cricket 
played, pace of bowling, years of experience, age). Their insightful article offers statements from 
each bowler that constitutes the ‘raw data’, and then two levels of higher order themes. Above that 
they list the ‘general dimensions’ which are the domains of interest and probes that they used. They 
do not attempt to derive a theoretical model from their data, but contribute to the literature at a 
descriptive level integrating their findings with contemporary theories of the yips and of choking. 
Further, this research offers a vivid window into the experience of the yips with affecting specificity. 
There is surprise and shock at its occurrence: participants said they had no idea it was about to 
happen, and helplessness was experienced, as one suggested the ball felt ‘stuck in his hand’. In the 
moment it is emotions that are highlighted, especially the emotions of trauma: pure shock, feeling 
destroyed, anxiety, panic, a wish to escape but an inability to ‘get out’, ‘can’t finish the over until get 
six legal balls, and trapped until you do’, negative thoughts of others’ perceptions. Participants 
found it ‘terrifying that they couldn’t do a simple task’ and reported a loss of personal agency ‘like I’d 
been taken over’ and a loss of ownership, where your ‘arm feels like it isn’t yours.’ This kind of data 
gives specific, experiential insight like no other. 
Not every researcher wishes to devise a full theory from qualitative data. There are statistics 
that can take to the next level what is revealed by the frequency of codes’ occurrence in light of 
other attributes and experiences of those in the research sample. This optimizes the generality of 
findings from specific interviews and codes. One can use factor analysis to look at the 
intercorrelation of codes to reveal strategies (Harris et al 2011). Or, one can use cluster analysis. For 
this procedure one needs first to look at the relative frequency of occurrence of certain codes across 
the whole sample. The use of cluster analysis to do this is well-represented in sports science (Ball & 
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Best, 2007; Gaudreau & Blondin, 2004) where clusters are generated from data gathered using 
scales, i.e. data that are already quantitative. We could not find a mixed method approach in sports 
where cluster analysis was used to determine profiles based on codes derived from interview or 
qualitative data. Therefore we use an example from outside the sports content domain because 
Wohl, Kuiken, and Noels (2006) outline their procedure in detail and offer clear advice about 
selection of statistics for a cluster analysis.  We briefly describe their procedure here as illustration of 
how clusters form and might be used.  Wohl et al. analyzed narratives of forgiveness and focused on 
codes that were neither rare (occurring in less than 10% of the narratives) nor ubiquitous (occurring 
in over 90% of the narratives). They then carried out a cluster analysis to see how the different codes 
clustered. Their results gave a three-cluster solution. Each participant is accorded a cluster number 
as an output of this analysis. This reflects the cluster within which their narrative fits. Results show 
the proportion of cluster members expressing a phrase within their narratives that attracted a 
particular code. One can then use the cluster number as a way of forming groups that may be used 
in Analysis of Variance or t-tests to see whether there are differences between clusters on certain 
outcome variables like well-being, relationship satisfaction and so on. Attributes which defined the 
clusters of forgiveness styles in this study illustrate how clusters differ from each other: Cluster One 
included those whose forgiveness began when they brought their feelings into the open with the 
transgressor; they were then able to let go of their negative feelings, and to see things in light of 
broader well-being concerns. Those in Cluster Two saw forgiveness as a private moral issue, and 
were able to return to a normal relationship even in the absence of an apology. Cluster Three 
included those who tried to maintain a positive relationship despite the wrong done to them, but 
could not forget: in contrast to the other two clusters, they did not see wider implications of 
forgiveness for their own well-being and the relationship never really recovered. 
Bawden and Maynard (2001) might have done a cluster analysis on their data. In addition to 
the qualitative codes derived from their interview data about experiences of the yips in cricket as 
potential clustering variables (e.g. the conditions before the yips happened, the first experience of 
15 
the yips, descriptions of subsequent bowling, perceived characteristics of good bowling, and 
personal explanations of the yips), they might also have included, as cluster determinants, other 
variables they assessed like age, handedness, pace and level of cricket. Cluster analysis would permit 
them to see if there were different forms of yips within their group and whether there were 
outcomes linked to that form of experience. By recommending integration of the use of statistics 
with detailed experiential studies of individuals, we hope to address two rarely integrated trends in 
research. 
Triangulating Methods: nomothetic and idiographic research 
We want to understand the law-like features of performance that generalize across 
participants (the nomothetic approach). But we also may sometimes wish to adopt the idiographic 
approach: to track an individual’s profile of strengths or difficulties, their ways of achieving 
excellence and resilience, or of experiencing performance breakdown, which may be quite 
unexpected and idiosyncratic. Sometimes there is a trade-off in research, but scientific 
understanding requires both approaches.  In areas like sport where expertise often takes unique 
forms, involving precise, stylistic features unlikely to transfer across individuals, the mapping of the 
uniqueness of the individual has more to offer than in many domains. Even when abilities or 
difficulties are highly individual, theory may identify levels of abstraction at which seemingly unique 
experiences or style might generalize to other players. Really understanding the forms of expertise - 
what optimizes and sustains them, as well as what causes them to be momentarily lost - requires 
both forms of knowledge. 
The triangulation of methods is a rare and joyous thing. In our chapter on breadth and depth 
of knowledge (Chapter 11), we discussed cases in which verbal report data are integrated with other 
measures such as eye movements. Sebanz and Shiffrar (2009) also found a compelling link up 
between self-report and perception. Generalising from literature on deceptive signals that leak out 
without the performer’s awareness of deceptive displays that are strategies, their study used stimuli 
that were constructed, where the player decided in advance whether to fake or make a pass.  They 
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used as their experimental stimuli only the fakes where the defender had been completely deceived. 
The defender was then edited out of the videos, thus ensuring the quality of the deceptive display. 
Experts were better than novices when movement was present but there were no significant 
differences with static posture alone. At the end of the study they distributed questionnaires, finding 
an overlap between self-report and observational data in terms of the emphasis on kinematics vs 
postural cues in the groups. The relevance of retaining what people could actually do was still 
underscored: they found that only experts could detect deception from kinematics alone (point-light 
displays), while novices were at chance. If Bruce, Farrow, Raynor & Mann (2012) had only observed 
what a person had been able to do in their study which sought to determine, across three tiers of 
expertise, whether strategic response selection was limited by motor skill capacity, they would have 
missed the fact that when asked for their verbal report on the optimum strategy, even lesser skilled 
people suggested a long pass would be optimal even where they could not reliably perform a long 
pass, which was pretty hard for everyone.  
In an area that is already rippling with insightful research designs to capture features of a 
dynamically unfolding and highly contingent set of skills, it is hard to suggest that there might be 
supplementary methods. Yet there are levels of skill which are beyond motor execution and 
perception-action coupling, but which inform them. The full picture of skill includes some 
dispositional forms of knowledge that are regularly updated, about self, other and game. Knowledge 
about self includes knowledge of current form, strength, speed, injury status and risk, how one 
handles risk and failure, and about one’s capacity to come back from failure. Knowledge about one’s 
competitor includes knowledge of their current form, stylistic strengths and weaknesses as well as 
an awareness of the degree to which they might have mapped one’s own form, strengths and 
weaknesses. There is also knowledge about context: the meaning of this game, what hinges on it, 
whether one is playing at home or away, and how much leeway there is for underperformance or 
whether every second has to count given the moment in the contest. Once skill is contextualized in 
this way, it is apparent that the motor and perceptual components of skill are an important part, 
17 
embedded in a wider story. We have attempted to canvas what we can add to the methodological 
tool-kit of research into sports expertise that addresses this wider story about forms of knowledge 
that feed into core skill features. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
References 
Arcuri, A. (2007) Psychotherapists’ handling of sexual attraction to clients: A grounded theory. PhD 
thesis, Department of Psychology, Macquarie University. 
Arcuri, A. & McIlwain, D.J.F. (2009) Psychotherapists’ handling of sexual attraction to clients: A 
grounded theory, in L. Richards (ed), Handling qualitative data, 2nd edition. London: Sage. URL: 
http://www.uk.sagepub.com/richards/homeP2.htm  
Ball, K.A., & Best, R. J. (2007) “Different centre of pressure patterns within the golf stroke I: Cluster 
analysis”, Journal of Sports Sciences, 25:7, 757-770 
Bawden, M. & Maynard, I. (2001) Towards an understanding of the personal experience of the ‘Yips’ 
in cricketers”, Journal of Sport Sciences, 19, 937-953. 
Bicknell, K. (2010) “Feeling them ride: Corporeal exchange in cross-country mountain bike racing”, 
About Performance, 10, 81-91. 
18 
Bruce, L., Farrow, D. Raynor, A., & Mann, D. (2012) But I can’t pass that far! The influence of motor 
skill on decision making”, Psychology of Sport and Exercise, 13, 152-161. 
Camic, P.M., Rhodes, J.E., & Yardley, L. (2003) Naming the stars: Integrating qualitative methods into 
psychological research. In P.M. Camic, J.E. Rhodes & L. Yardley (eds), Qualitative Research in 
Psychology: expanding perspectives in methodology and design (pp. 3-15). Washington: 
American Psychological Association. 
Chaffin, R., Imreh, G., & Crawford, M. (2002) Practicing perfection: Memory and piano performance. 
New York: Laurence Erlbaum Associates.  
Dennett, D.C. (2003) Freedom evolves. New York: Allen Lane. 
Dundon, T. & Ryan, P. (2010) Interviewing reluctant respondents: Strikes, henchmen, and Gaelic 
games”, Organizational Research Methods, 13, 562-581. 
Eccles, D.W. (2012) Verbal reports of cognitive processes, in G. Tenenbaum, R. Eklund, & A. Kamata 
(eds), Measurement in sport and exercise psychology (pp. 103-117). Champaign, IL: Human 
Kinetics. 
Ericsson, K.A. (2006) Protocol analysis and expert thought: Concurrent verbalizations of thinking 
during experts’ performance on representative tasks, in K.A. Ericsson, N. Charness, P.J. 
Feltovich, & R.R. Hoffman (eds), The Cambridge handbook of expertise and expert 
performance (pp. 223-241). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Ericsson, K.A. & Simon, H.A. (1980) Verbal reports as data, Psychological Review, 87, 215-251. 
Fassinger, R. E. (2005) Paradigms, praxis, problems, and promise: Grounded theory in counseling 
psychology research, Journal of Counseling Psychology, 52, 156-166. 
Feather, N.T. (1989) Attitudes towards the high achiever: The fall of the tall poppy, Australian 
Journal of Psychology, 41, 239-267. 
19 
Fox, M.C., Ericsson, K.A., & Best, R. (2011) “Do Procedures for Verbal Reporting of Thinking have to 
be Reactive? A meta-analysis and recommendations for best reporting method”, Psychological 
Bulletin 137, 316-344. 
Gaudreau, P., & Blondin, J-P, (2004) “Different athletes cope differently during a sport competition: 
a cluster analysis of coping”, Journal of Personality and Individual Differences, 36, 1865–1877. 
Gilgun, J. (1995) We shared something special: The moral discourse of incest perpetrators”, Journal 
of Marriage and Family, 57, 265-281. 
Gilgun, J. (2009) Qualitative research and family psychology, in J.H. Bray & M. Stanton (eds), The 
Wiley-Blackwell handbook of family psychology (pp. 85-99). London: Wiley. 
Glaser, B.G., & Strauss, A.L. (1967) The discovery of grounded theory: Strategies for qualitative 
research. Hawthorne, NY: Aldine Publishing Company. 
Harris, C.B., Keil, P.G., Sutton, J., Barnier, A.J., & McIlwain, D.J.F. (2011) ‘We remember, we forget’: 
collaborative remembering in older couples, Discourse Processes, 48, 267-303. 
Loevinger, J. (1985) Revision of the sentence completion test for ego development” Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 48, 420-427.  
Marecek, J. (2003) Dancing through minefields: Toward a qualitative stance in psychology. In P.M. 
Camic, J.E. Rhodes & L. Yardley (eds), Qualitative research in psychology: Expanding 
perspectives in methodology and design (pp. 49-69). Washington: American Psychological 
Association. 
McPherson, S.L. & MacMahon, C. (2008) How baseball players prepare to bat: Tactical knowledge as 
a mediator of expert performance in baseball, Journal of Sport and Exercise Psychology, 30, 
755-778. 
20 
McRobert, A.P., Ward, P., Eccles, D.W., & Williams, A.M. (2011) The effect of manipulating context-
specific information on perceptual-cognitive processes during a simulated anticipation task, 
British Journal of Psychology, 102, 519-534. 
Morrow, S. L. (2005) Quality and trustworthiness in qualitative research in counseling psychology, 
Journal of Counseling Psychology, 52, 250-260. 
Nisbett, R.E. & Wilson, T.C. (1977) Telling more than we can know: Verbal reports on mental 
processes, Psychological Review, 84, 231-259. 
Ponterotto, J. G. (2005) Qualitative research in counseling psychology: A primer on research 
paradigms and philosophy of science, Journal of Counseling Psychology, 52, 126-136. 
Raffaelli, M., Koller, S., Reppold, C., Kuschick, M., Krum, F., Bandeira, D., & Simões, C. (2001) Gender 
differences in Brazilian street youth’s family circumstances and experiences on the street, 
Child Abuse & Neglect, 24, 1431-1441. 
Roca, A., Ford, P.R., McRobert, A.P., & Williams, A.M. (2011) Identifying the processes underlying 
anticipation and decision-making in a dynamic time-constrained task, Cognitive Processing, 12, 
301-310. 
Sebanz, N. & Shiffrar, M. (2009) Detecting deception in a bluffing body: The role of expertise, 
Psychonomic Bulletin & Review, 16, 170-175. 
Strauss, A., & Corbin, J. (1998) Basics of qualitative research: Techniques and procedures for 
developing grounded theory (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks: Sage Publications. 
Wiersma, J. (1988) The press release: Symbolic communication in life history interviewing, Journal of 
Personality, 56, 205-238. 
Wohl, M.J.A., Kuiken, D., & Noels, K.A. (2006). Three ways to forgive: A numerically-aided 
phenomenological study”, British Journal of Social Psychology, 45, 547-561. 
